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The first protests of the Arab Spring began in December of 2010 
in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia.1  Within a few months, the autocratic 
leaders of Tunisia and Egypt had been dethroned, and democratic 
elections and new constitutions followed in relatively short order.2  
From that point, the common fates of these two countries started to 
diverge—and diverge for reasons that scholars have not yet entirely 
recognized. 
The new Constitution of Egypt solidified Cairo as the capital,3 
and the new Egyptian national government centralized itself near 
Tahrir Square in Cairo.4 By contrast, Article 50 of the interim 
Tunisian Constitution provided that “[t]he headquarters of the 
Chamber of Deputies shall be located in Tunis and the suburbs 
 Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University School of 
Law.  My thanks to Richard Albert, Eugene Mazo, and the editors of the Wake 
Forest Law Review for inviting me to the symposium on “Constitution-Making 
and Constitutional Design” at Boston College Law School.  For comments on 
this Essay, my thanks to Michael Abramowicz and Naomi Schoenbaum. 
1. Arab Uprising: Country by Country—Tunisia, BBC (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482315. 
2. See id.; Greg Botelho, Arab Spring Aftermath: Revolutions Give Way to
Violence, More Unrest, CNN (Mar. 28, 2015, 1:52 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015 
/03/27/middleeast/arab-spring-aftermath/. 
3. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 26 Dec. 2012, art. 220
(“Cairo is the capital of the State.”) (translated from Arabic by author); see also 
id. art. 92 (“The seats of both the House of Representatives and the Shura 
Council are in Cairo.”) (translated from Arabic by author); id. art. 175 (“The 
Supreme Constitutional Court is an independent judicial body, seated in 
Cairo . . . .”) (translated from Arabic by author).  An unofficial full translation of 
the 2012 Egyptian Constitution can be found at http://constitutionaltransitions 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Egypt-Constitution-26-December-2012.pdf. 
4. See Matt Ford, A Dictator’s Guide to Urban Design, ATLANTIC (Feb. 21,
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/02/a-dictator’s-
guide-to-urban-design/283953/ (“Cairo’s layout also made Tahrir Square the 
perfect place to launch a revolution.  Centrally located in Egypt’s largest city, 
Tahrir sits near the Egyptian parliament, Mubarak’s political party 
headquarters, the presidential palace, numerous foreign embassies, and hotels 
filled with international journalists to broadcast footage of the protests for 
audiences around the world.”). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2753737 
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thereof.”5  In Tunis, government offices were distributed across the 
greater Tunis metropolitan area, with some crucial parts of the 
national government even located in Bardo, a suburb of Tunis.6 
Come the summer of 2013, a new wave of popular mobilizations 
influenced Egypt and Tunisia, and these differences in the 
geography of national power were part of the equation.7  Video 
images showed opponents of the Egyptian regime occupying Tahrir 
Square and surrounding the Egyptian government.8  Several 
months later, when protests emerged in Tunis, video images showed 
a split screen of protesters trying to disrupt the government in 
central Tunis at the same time as other protesters were taking 
public transportation out to the suburbs to protest there as well.9 
This is just one example of a larger blind spot for those studying 
democratic transitions: geography.10  The central issues to address 
as countries manage democratic transitions have long occupied the 
attention of social scientists.11  In recent decades, legal scholars 
5. DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, Apr. 22, 2013, art. 50
(translated from Arabic by author) (emphasis added).  An unofficial full 
translation of the 2013 Tunisian Draft Constitution can be found at 
http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Tunisia-third 
-draft-Constitution-22-April-2013.pdf. 
6. See Roua Khlifi, Ennahdha and Allies Reject Calls for NCA Dissolution,




7. There were many variables that undermined the Egyptian regime that
did not undermine the Tunisian regime, none of which were necessarily 
conclusive.  For a helpful discussion of this, see JASON BROWNLEE ET AL., THE 
ARAB SPRING: PATHWAYS OF REPRESSION AND REFORM (2015).  The only point to be 
made here is that Egypt’s differential treatment of the geography of national 
power was part of the progression of events. 
8. Protests Continue in Egypt’s Tahrir Square, NBC NIGHTLY NEWS (June
30, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/video/nightly-news/52359178#52359178. 
9. Louafi Larbi, National Strike, Protests and Clashes as Tunisia Mourns
for Assassinated Opposition Leader, RT (Feb. 9, 2013, 8:58 AM), 
https://www.rt.com/news/tunisia-belaid-funeral-protests-741/. 
10. For an excellent, related paper about the geography of the Arab Spring,
see generally Ellis Goldberg, The Urban Roots of the Arab Spring (Apr. 20, 
2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2426960 (arguing that a swift overthrow of a government can 
typically only occur in countries with a primate capital city like Egypt and 
Tunisia).  For a related paper about democratic activity and geography at the 
level of the metropolitan area rather than the country, see generally Brian B. 
Knudsen & Terry N. Clark, Walk and Be Moved: How Walking Builds Social 
Movements, 49 URB. AFF. REV. 627 (2013) (analyzing the relationship between 
urban environments and social movement organizations). 
11. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND
OPPOSITION (1971) (discussing conditions that favor or impede democratic 
transitions); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991) (examining the causes, processes, and 
consequences of various democratic transitions between 1974 and 1990); Juan J. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2753737 
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have also started to examine democratic transitions.12  Geography is 
featured in debates about democratic transitions but largely in 
debates about federalism in fragile democracies.13  Scholars focus on 
the arguments for and against separating power across space and 
across different governmental units.14  Democratic transitions must 
address another, equally important question related to geography, 
one raised by the Egyptian and Tunisian narratives provided above: 
the geographical distribution of national power. 
One of the most crucial decisions that a fragile democratic 
system designing its constitution must address is where to place 
national power.  Constitutions usually do address where the 
national government will be located, simply because it is difficult to 
coordinate governmental actions without a consensus definition of 
where government convenes.15  This is an issue that those drafting 
constitutions have spent much time considering.  Scholars, however, 
have not yet provided a framework for understanding how this 
important decision is to be made—and particularly how it shapes 
the representative nature of an emerging democratic regime.  If one 
of the ambitions of democracy is to feature a representative 
government, then one of the key means by which that representative 
government can be achieved is through locational decisions related 
to the national government. 
The goal of this Symposium Essay is to sketch out very 
generally the different options that constitution designers have at 
their disposal in deciding where to locate national power and the 
 
Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration, in THE BREAKDOWN OF 
DEMOCRATIC REGIMES 3 (Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan eds., 1978) (analyzing 
prominent changes in political regimes to evaluate the process of the breakdown 
of democracy and the conditions for democratic stability); Seymour Martin 
Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959) (analyzing conditions 
associated with the existence and stability of democratic societies that are 
external to the political system). 
 12. See generally ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONS (2009) (discussing the effects of democratic transitions on 
constitutional stability); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000) 
(analyzing legal responses and the role of law in the context of political 
transformation). 
 13. See, e.g., ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION: 
THE POLITICS OF IMPOSED REVOLUTION IN IRAQ 232–33 (2009); LARRY DIAMOND, 
SQUANDERED VICTORY: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND THE BUNGLED EFFORT TO 
BRING DEMOCRACY TO IRAQ 163 (2005). 
 14. See, e.g., AOIFE O’DONOGHUE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISATION 34–38 (2014). 
 15. Rules locating the national capital function as a “coordination rule,” 
meaning that they are “logically impossible . . . to create” without some initial 
agreement about their content.  Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of 
Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 366 (2004).  It is difficult—if 
not impossible—for a legislature to convene, for instance, without prior, formal 
agreement about where that legislature is to convene.  Id. 
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central implications of each of these options for how representative 
the national government of an emerging democratic regime is likely 
to be.  The goal is not to endorse one option as superior in all 
contexts, but simply to provide a roadmap of the paths that can be 
taken and the implications of each of these paths for the central 
democratic goal of generating a representative national 
government.16 
I.  THE CHOICES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOCATION OF NATIONAL 
POWER 
Locating national power in fragile democracies drafting 
constitutions involves two dimensions of choices.  First, a decision 
must be made regarding how many locations will feature national 
power.  Second, regardless of how many locations feature national 
power, decisions must be made regarding what type of metropolitan 
area will feature national power.  These locational choices have two 
dimensions of implications related to the representativeness of 
national power.  Where the national government is located will 
influence the identity of the officials exercising national power  and 
will also influence the interactions of the officials exercising national 
power. 
A. The Choices 
As an initial matter, constitution designers must decide 
whether to create a single national center of power or multiple 
national centers of power.  Some countries, like Germany and South 
Africa, have located different parts of the national government in 
different metropolitan areas.17  Other countries, like the United 
States, have centralized national power more in a singular 
metropolitan area.18 
 
 16. Other implications of placing governments in fragile democratic 
regimes are saved for another essay. 
 17. See Alan Mabin, South African Capital Cities, in CAPITAL CITIES IN 
AFRICA: POWER AND POWERLESSNESS 168, 168 (Simon Bekker & Göran Therborn 
eds., 2012); Richard L. Merritt, The Lost Center: Dispersing Berlin’s Capital 
City Functions, 1945–78, in WESTERN EUROPEAN CITIES IN CRISIS 185, 185, 194 
(Michael C. Romanos ed., 1979). 
 18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (referencing a single “District” with 
“ten miles square” as “the Seat of the Government of the United States”) 
(emphasis added).  The Twenty-Third Amendment later reiterated this.  See 
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1 (referencing “[t]he District constituting the seat 
of Government of the United States” and how its representation in Congress 
would compare to “a State”) (emphasis added).  The Residence Act of 1790 
states that “[a]ll offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in 
the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere.”  4 U.S.C. § 72 (2012) (emphasis 
added).  See generally David Fontana, The Spatial Separation of Powers (2015) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the advantages of 
physically separating federal power across several metropolitan areas and 
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Once constitution designers have decided how many national 
centers of power there shall be, they then must decide between 
different types of metropolitan areas in which to locate national 
power.  Three genres of choices are possible.  First, constitution 
designers can decide to place national power in a primate 
metropolitan area.19  A primate area is an area that is the single 
dominant metropolitan area within a country20—Cairo in Egypt is a 
great example.21  In most countries, the primate metropolitan area 
is also the primary (or exclusive) capital metropolitan area.22 
Second, national power can be placed in a major metropolitan 
area that is not the single dominant metropolitan area within 
national borders.  A country without a primate metropolitan area 
can choose to place national power in the most substantial 
metropolitan area, even if that substantial metropolitan area does 
not rise to the level of a primate metropolitan area.  An example of 
this could be the Constitution of Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet 
Union,23 which placed national power in Kiev, a major metropolitan 
area but not a primate metropolitan area.  Even with a primate 
metropolitan area, a country could place national power in a 
different major metropolitan area.  The Czech Republic, for instance, 
located the constitutional court in Brno rather than in Prague 
 
critiquing the current system of spatially unified federal power in the United 
States). 
 19. Scholars have started to use the term “metropolitan area” rather than 
“city” because of the vast range of forces encompassed in the modern urban 
form.  See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 277, 278 (2007). 
 20. See generally Alberto F. Ades & Edward L. Glaeser, Trade and 
Circuses: Explaining Urban Giants, 110 Q.J. ECON. 195 (1995) (investigating 
the factors behind the concentration of a nation’s urban population in one city); 
Sebastian Galiani & Sukkoo Kim, Political Centralization and Urban Primacy: 
Evidence from National and Provincial Capitals in the Americas, in 
UNDERSTANDING LONG-RUN ECONOMIC GROWTH: GEOGRAPHY, INSTITUTIONS, AND 
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 121 (Dora L. Costa & Naomi R. Lamoreaux eds., 
2011) (investigating the role of provincial and state capitals in Latin America 
and the United States); Mark Jefferson, The Law of the Primate City, 29 
GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 226 (1939) (investigating the role of primate cities around 
the world); Arnold S. Linsky, Some Generalizations Concerning Primate Cities, 
55 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 506 (1965) (testing six different hypotheses 
on the conditions under which primate cities occur). 
 21. Cairo is home to approximately a quarter of Egypt’s population, and is 
many times larger than the second largest metropolitan area (Alexandria).  See 
The World Factbook—Egypt, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the 
-world-factbook/geos/eg.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20150912032354 
/https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html] (last 
updated Sept. 4, 2015) (listing Cairo’s population at 18.772 million and 
Alexandria’s population at 4.778 million). 
 22. See Galiani & Kim, supra note 20, at 121 (“[I]n almost every country, 
the primate city [is] usually a capital city . . . .”). 
 23. UKR. CONST., art. 20, para. 7 (1996) (“The capital of Ukraine is the City 
of Kyiv.”). 
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(where the legislature and the executive are located) after the Berlin 
Wall fell in 1989.24 
Third, national power can be placed in a specially constructed 
capital metropolitan area.  This new capital could have previously 
been a nonexistent metropolitan area, which was largely the case for 
Washington, D.C., before the United States decided to make it the 
capital.25  The new capital could be located in an area that was a 
smaller metropolitan area.  The decision to make that smaller 
metropolitan area into the capital is essentially creating a new 
capital, because the metropolitan area was so small previously as 
not to shape the new, formidable capital in a meaningful fashion. 
Examples of this approach include the decision to construct a new 
Malaysian capital in Putrajay,26 or the recent discussion about 
Egypt constructing a new national capital metropolitan area.27 
B. The Implications of the Choices 
This question of where to place national power has two 
categories of implications.  First, it influences the identity of the 
officials exercising national power.  Labor markets have been 
changed by technology, but it is still the case that most people work 
relatively close to where they reside, and most people do not move 
great distances for employment opportunities.28  This tends to be 
true even at the higher levels of employment.29  This means that 
those working in government will be those who live near where 
government is located.  Because transportation costs play a major 
role in where people work, and these costs tend to be higher outside 
of the stable democracies,30 the location of national power will shape 
who exercises national power even more in fragile democracies. 
The location of national power, then, shapes the background of 
those who serve in national office.  One of the central challenges of a 
fragile democratic regime is ensuring that wide ranges of political 
forces are actually represented in national office.  Constitution 
 
 24. See ÚSTAVNÍ SOUD [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT], http://www.usoud.cz/en 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2015). 
 25. See KENNETH R. BOWLING, THE CREATION OF WASHINGTON, D.C.: THE 
IDEA AND LOCATION OF THE AMERICAN CAPITAL 238–39 (1991). 
 26. See Sarah Moser, Putrajaya: Malaysia’s New Federal Administrative 
Capital, 27 CITIES 285, 285 (2010). 
 27. See Matt Schiavenza, Egypt’s New Potemkin Capital, ATLANTIC (Mar. 
15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/egypt-to 
-build-a-potemkin-capital/387826/?utm_source=btn-email-pckt. 
 28. See Richard Florida, Why Americans Are Moving Less: New Jobs Aren’t 
Worth It, CITYLAB (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/work/2014/04/why 
-americans-are-moving-less-new-jobs-arent-worth-it/8973/. 
 29. See Edward L. Glaeser & Janet E. Kohlhase, Cities, Regions and the 
Decline of Transport Costs, 83 PAPERS REGIONAL SCI. 197, 223 (2004). 
 30. See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1509–10 & n.14; infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
W09_FONTANA  (DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2015  6:55 PM 
2015] GOVERNMENT IN FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES 991 
drafters focus on various design tools to achieve this diversity of 
representation.  The debate about parliamentary versus presidential 
regimes for fragile democracies, for instance, features strong 
disagreements about whether presidential or parliamentary systems 
better open up the political process for a diverse range of officials.31  
Another aspect of this representation debate is a locational feature.  
Constitution drafters think about what political forces must be 
represented in government as a means of thinking about where 
governments should be located.  During a chaotic moment in its 
history, Nigeria moved parts of its capital from Lagos to Abuja so 
that there would be more Muslims in government.32 
The location of the national government shapes its identity not 
just in practice, but also in perception.  In stable democratic 
systems, voters use political parties as heuristics to make decisions 
about who does and should hold national power.33  In fragile 
democracies, there is either one34 or no party brand with known 
means to guide citizens.35  Places tend to be strong heuristics that 
guide perceptions,36 and without party brands, citizens will turn to 
place brands even more strongly.  This means that the location of 
national power will tell citizens who exercises national power. 
Second, the location of national power influences the 
interactions of the new national regime that is created by the new 
constitutional system.  Our most important personal and 
professional relationships are still overwhelmingly our most 
physically proximate relationships.37  Placing national power is a 
 
 31. For a notable summary of the arguments and contribution to the 
debate, see generally Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000) (comparing and contrasting American-style separation 
of powers with “constrained parliamentarianism”). 
 32. See LAWRENCE J. VALE, ARCHITECTURE, POWER, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
134–35 (1992). 
 33. See ROBERT S. ERIKSON ET AL., THE MACRO POLITY 68 (2002); MORRIS P. 
FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 89–98, 105 
(1981) (discussing how individuals choose and change party identification). 
 34. For example, South Africa has a “dominant party” system, where one 
party—the African National Congress—has won a majority of the recent 
national elections.  See Sujit Choudhry, ‘He Had a Mandate’: The South African 
Constitutional Court and the African National Congress in a Dominant Party 
Democracy, 2 CONST. CT. REV. 1, 3 (2009). 
 35. See George B. N. Ayittey, How the Multilateral Institutions 
Compounded Africa’s Economic Crisis, 30 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 585, 594 (1999). 
 36. See generally Michael Manville, People, Race and Place: American 
Support for Person- and Place-Based Urban Policy, 1973-2008, 49 URB. STUD. 
3101 (2012) (examining whether Americans associate big cities with African 
Americans); Harvey Molotch, Place in Product, 26 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL 
RES. 665 (2002) (arguing that products can be tracers to the places from which 
they come from). 
 37. See, e.g., Luís M. A. Bettencourt, The Origins of Scaling in Cities, 340 
SCIENCE 1438, 1441 (2013) (“Institutions and industries that benefit from strong 
mutual interactions may aggregate in space and time within the city . . . .”); 
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means of shaping what relationships those in national power will 
cultivate with those inside and outside of the national government. 
II.  THE MULTIPLE-CAPITAL APPROACH 
Federalism assumes different governments that share 
overlapping control over the same physical territory.38  Implied 
within this definition of federalism is that these different 
governments themselves are located in different places.  There 
would be much less—or no—point to federalism if the capitals of 
California and New York were also in the District of Columbia. 
Different physical locations have also become a more common 
part of the exercise of national power.  The most notable example of 
the multiple-capital approach arose in the aftermath of World War 
II in Germany.  The Allied forces occupying Germany after World 
War II insisted that German national power be spread out over 
eight cities.39  Even with more national power located in Berlin, it is 
still the case that important parts of the German national 
government are separated among many different metropolitan 
areas.40  The multiple-capital approach provides a geographical 
safeguard ensuring a diverse range of officials working for and 
interacting with the national government. 
A. Officials in Multiple-Capital Regimes 
Multiple capitals diversify the officials in a national government 
as powerfully as any other constitutional design tool available to 
fragile democracies.  For single capitals to employ officials from all 
over a country, these officials must be willing to endure the direct 
cost of relocating to the single capital.  In many fragile democracies, 
infrastructural limitations can make this direct cost a substantial 
cost.41  That direct cost also entails substantial opportunity costs.  
There is the opportunity cost that a substantial amount of travel 
time to the single capital creates.42  There is the opportunity cost of 
foregoing personal and professional relationships in the previous 
 
Diana Mok et al., Does Distance Matter in the Age of the Internet?, 47 URB. 
STUD. 2747, 2779 (2010) (“The frequency of face-to-face and phone contact 
among various role relationships has hardly changed between the 1970s and 
the 2000s.”). 
 38. In William Riker’s famous definition of federalism, “two levels of 
government rule the same land and people.”  WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: 
ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 11 (1964). 
 39. See Gordon A. Craig, Berlin, the Hauptstadt: Back Where It Belongs, 77 
FOREIGN AFF. 161, 166–68 (1998). 
 40. See id. at 170. 
 41. See, e.g., Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy in Africa: African and 
International Imperatives, 14 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 191, 197 (2000). 
 42. See Glaeser & Kohlhase, supra note 29, at 208–09. 
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place of residence43—relationships that will also be harder to 
maintain from a distance because of weaker infrastructure. 
The benefits of relocating to the single capital will be lower 
because of the discounted value of serving in government.  In stable 
democracies, many scholars have framed public service as a form of 
deferred compensation.44  Officials rotate in and out of government.  
The skills and relationships they developed in government result in 
greater returns once out of government.45  In fragile democracies, 
the benefits of public service are not as enormous.  The potential for 
a dramatic change in who runs a country could mean that the skills 
and relationships built in government are worthless outside of 
government. 
The geographical dispersion of a country’s population will 
substantially determine the diversity of officials in government.  
Many fragile democracies are smaller in terms of square miles.46  
This reduces the costs for individuals to relocate to the single 
capital.  A primate metropolitan area dominates many fragile 
democracies.47  If there is a primate metropolitan area that houses 
the national government, there are fewer types of officials present in 
other places and missing from the capital metropolitan area. 
B. Official Interactions in Multiple-Capital Regimes 
The fragile democratic regime that creates a multiple-capital 
system increases the capacity of the national government to interact 
with a diverse range of private forces.48  If the national government 
wishes to obtain information about private forces outside of a single 
capital, it can try to interact with these forces directly, but this 
poses substantial complications.  Information from a distance is less 
precise and reliable than information from across the street.49  The 
national government can decide to travel to areas outside of the 
single capital, but this will generate the direct costs of travel as well 
 
 43. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1169, 
1174–75. 
 44. See Ackerman, supra note 31, at 708–09. 
 45. See id. at 709. 
 46. Compare The World Factbook—Country Comparison: Area, CIA, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder 
/2147rank.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (ranking countries by size using 
square kilometers), with THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DEMOCRACY INDEX 
2014: DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 4–7 (2015), http://www.sudestada.com 
.uy/Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b24-2504a37f6b56/Democracy-index-
2014.pdf (classifying several countries as flawed democracies or hybrid 
regimes). 
 47. See Galiani & Kim, supra note 20, at 121–22. 
 48. See Merritt, supra note 17, at 194–95, 201. 
 49. See Michael Storper & Anthony J. Venables, Buzz: Face-to-Face Contact 
and the Urban Economy, in INSTITUTIONS, INCENTIVES AND COMMUNICATION IN 
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 43, 61–62 (Michael Storper ed., 2004). 
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as the costs of imprecise information that result from less frequent 
interactions with physically distant individuals.50 
While information is more easily obtained in the multiple-
capital regime, it is more difficult for the multiple-capital regime to 
act on this information.  One of the tools of constitutional design to 
weaken the state is to generate a series of transaction costs that the 
state must endure in order to engage in some form of action.51  This 
is usually done through a series of procedural hurdles like 
federalism and the separation of powers.52  These procedural 
hurdles mean either that government cannot act at all or that if it 
can act, it must purchase the cost of consent of multiple actors in 
order to overcome the veto gates they operate.53 
One of the concerns about generating more representation is 
that this representation can undermine the democratic process.  A 
national government with excess capacity to monitor private forces 
can be a government that does not recognize and respect constraints 
on power.54  A multiple-capital approach ensures that some part of 
the national government is exposed to the full range of private forces 
because some part of the national government is located in many 
different metropolitan areas.  This means that some part of the 
national government is able to monitor private forces at lower cost 
because of physical proximity.  However, because the national 
government itself is geographically fragmented, this reduces the 
capacity of the national government to merge information about 
private forces and coordinate a response.  Indeed, related empirical 
evidence has demonstrated that national governments with large 
amounts of physically proximate information about private threats 
can be particularly dangerous national governments.55 
Private forces with excess capacity to monitor a national 
government can also undermine the democratic process by 
generating the threat of antidemocratic mob violence.56  A crucial 
 
 50. See id. at 62. 
 51. See Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 12 (1987). 
 52. See id. at 12–14. 
 53. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2338 (2006). 
 54. See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: 
Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
1, 1 (1995). 
 55. See Ades & Glaeser, supra note 20, at 195 (“Dictatorships have central 
cities that are, on average, 50 percent larger than their democratic 
counterparts.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Wadah Khanfar, Egypt Must Get Back on the Path of 
Democratic Change, THEGUARDIAN (July 28, 2013, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/28/egypt-democratic-
change-deep-state-violent. 
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feature of a successful effort to overthrow a government is scale.57  It 
requires many outraged citizens organizing and protesting in the 
streets to create the kind of pressure that leads governments to 
fall.58  Dispersing national power makes it harder for those trying to 
overthrow a national government to succeed.  Antidemocratic forces 
have to organize and coordinate joint efforts across large physical 
spaces, rather than organize and coordinate joint efforts in a single 
place—say, Tahrir Square in Cairo in 2013.59  Indeed, a famous 
saying about Germany was that “whoever took Berlin ruled 
Germany.”60 
III.  THE PRIMATE-CAPITAL APPROACH 
In addition to the decision about how many national capitals to 
utilize, fragile democracies must decide which capitals to utilize.  
The first—and most common—approach is to locate national power 
in the primate metropolitan area in that country.61  In most fragile 
democracies, this decision to locate national power in the primate 
capital is not much of a conscious decision.  There are no or very few 
other metropolitan areas with the capacity to handle the national 
government.  The choice becomes either locating national power in a 
primate capital or constructing an entirely new metropolitan area to 
host national power. 
The representative ambitions of fragile democracies can be 
buttressed by the diverse range of people that live and work in the 
primate capital—although this diverse range of people can live and 
work all over a primate capital, meaning that where national power 
is located within the primate capital becomes important.  This 
greater exposure to large numbers of diverse private forces, though, 
poses risks that the primate capital will go to extremes, and that 
either the national government will become too powerful or those 
 
 57. See generally Filipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do, Inequality, 
Redistribution, and Population (Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t 
Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWP07-046, 2007) 
(exploring the relationship between the size of a country’s population and the 
threat of revolution). 
 58. Major violence tends to be a greater feature of life in major 
metropolitan areas than in life elsewhere.  See Dennis DiPasquale & Edward L. 
Glaeser, The Los Angeles Riot and the Economics of Urban Unrest, 43 J. URB. 
ECON. 52, 56 (1998) (“Urbanization is positively correlated with rioting, which 
perhaps means that political unrest is easier to organize in cities.”). 
 59. Compare Mabin, supra note 17, at 171–72, 174–75 (discussing South 
Africa’s multiple capitals and how it has retained those capitals following 
Apartheid), with Shaimaa Fayed & Yasmine Saleh, Egyptians Flood Streets to 
Demand Mursi Ouster, REUTERS (June 30, 2013, 11:08 PM), http://in 
.reuters.com/article/2013/06/30/egypt-protests-idINDEE95T03W20130630 
(discussing the millions involved in a protest in Egypt in June 2013). 
 60. Craig, supra note 39, at 165. 
 61. See Galiani & Kim, supra note 20, at 121. 
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trying to overthrow the national government will be able to do so too 
easily. 
A. Officials in Primate Capitals 
The primate capital is meant to provide diverse representation 
at the metropolitan level comparable to that provided by multiple 
capitals among metropolitan areas.62  Metropolitan areas generally 
encourage labor specialization because the larger numbers of 
opportunities generate deep markets.63  Deep markets provide a 
form of risk pooling, or insurance against “firm-specific shocks.”64  
One can specialize in a particular area of economic or social life 
because greater alternative opportunities ensure that as one door 
closes, another specialized door opens.  Greater learning within that 
specialization is facilitated by the ease of knowledge spillovers in 
metropolitan areas.65  With this greater specialization comes greater 
productive benefits, as people can specialize in areas in which they 
have a comparative advantage.66  These dynamics of metropolitan 
life are part of the reason that metropolitan areas specialize in 
particular features of economic or social life, rather than offering a 
little bit of every feature of economic or social life.67 
The primate capital—as compared to other metropolitan 
forms—is substantial enough to encourage a broader range of 
specializations.  Deep labor can be specialized and especially 
productive across many dimensions.68  Those from outside of the 
 
 62. It is not a primate city, but a similar argument was made when the 
capital was moved from Bonn to Berlin after the fall of the Berlin Wall: “Berlin 
will require us to become aware of arising social conflicts more directly than 
Bonn would.”  Andreas W. Daum, Capitals in Modern History: Inventing Urban 
Spaces for the Nation, in BERLIN–WASHINGTON, 1800–2000: CAPITAL CITIES, 
CULTURAL REPRESENTATION, AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES 3, 15 (Andreas W. Daum 
& Christof Mauch eds., 2005) (quoting Deputy Otto Schily).  The hope was that 
Washington would eventually become a primate capital—it would become “the 
Rome of America in the arts, the Berlin of America in education, and the Paris 
of America as a city of beauty and pleasure.”  Carl Abbott, International Cities 
in the Dual Systems Model: The Transformations of Los Angeles and 
Washington, 18 URB. HIST. Y.B. 41, 51 (1991). 
 63. See, e.g., James R. Baumgardner, The Division of Labor, Local Markets, 
and Worker Organization, 96 J. POL. ECON. 509, 510 (1988); Christopher H. 
Wheeler, Cities and the Growth of Wages Among Young Workers: Evidence from 
the NLSY, 60 J. URB. ECON. 162, 165 (2006). 
 64. See Edward L. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 139, 146 
(1998). 
 65. See, e.g., ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 271–72 (8th ed. 
1953). 
 66. See Glaeser, supra note 64, at 145–46. 
 67. See, e.g., Guy Dumais et al., Geographic Concentration as a Dynamic 
Process, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 193, 193–97 (2002). 
 68. See Joseph Gyourko et al., Superstar Cities 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 12,355, 2006), http://www.nber.org/papers 
/w12355.pdf. 
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primate metropolitan area know of these many and different 
specialties, and thus different types of people move to the primate 
metropolitan area in pursuit of opportunities.69 
For the national government, this means that a diverse labor 
supply exists in the same metropolitan area as the national 
government.  Because a broader range of people are closer to the 
national government, a broader range of individuals are more likely 
to work for the national government.70  Moving into government in 
the same metropolitan area would not entail the same costs to 
personal71 and professional relationships72 that would be entailed by 
moving across the country.  Other industries outside of government 
can benefit from being located proximate to the government, in the 
form of reduced regulation or increased government contracts,73 and 
a stint in government can be of assistance to the primate-capital 
worker even after they serve in government. 
There are limitations to the representational promise of the 
primate capital.  First, because of the primate capital’s proximate 
diversity—diversity located within the same metropolitan area—
there are powerful forces narrowing diversity.  Different forces tend 
to converge when exposed to the same, place-specific stimuli.  As 
Cass Sunstein noted, “[p]eople frequently think and do what they 
think and do because of what they think (relevant) others think and 
do.”74  The “relevant others” shaping how we think tend to be those 
with whom we have the strongest relationships.75  We have our 
 
 69. See DAVID K. IHRKE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY: 
2008 TO 2009, at 16 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p20-565.pdf; 
Yong Chen & Stuart S. Rosenthal, Local Amenities and Life-Cycle Migration: 
Do People Move for Jobs or Fun?, 64 J. URB. ECON. 519, 519 (2008); Edward L. 
Glaeser, A World of Cities: The Causes and Consequences of Urbanization in 
Poorer Countries 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19,745, 
2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19745. 
 70. See Galiani & Kim, supra note 20, at 128. 
 71. See, e.g., Mok et al., supra note 37, at 2750. 
 72. See, e.g., Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The 
Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 490 (1985); Frank P. Romo & 
Michael Schwartz, The Structural Embeddedness of Business Decisions: The 
Migration of Manufacturing Plants in New York State, 1960 to 1985, 60 AM. 
SOC. REV. 874, 879 (1995); Brian Uzzi, Social Structure and Competition in 
Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of Embeddedness, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 35, 41–42 
(1997). 
 73. H.G. OVERMAN & ANTHONY J. VENABLES, CITIES IN THE DEVELOPING 
WORLD 9 (2005), http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0695.pdf. 
 74. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 16 
(2001); see also Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the 
Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 614 (2000) (summarizing this 
literature about social influences). 
 75. On the power of those closest to us in our social networks, see Ronald S. 
Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural 
Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287, 1327–28 (1987); Nicholas A. Christakis & 
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strongest relationships with those in the same metropolitan area.76  
Exposure to the same place-specific, salient issues shapes what 
issues those in the same metropolitan area think are important.77  
Exposure to the same “epistemic communities” of policy experts in 
the same metropolitan area creates convergence on how to view 
these issues.78  The result is that all of these different forces in the 
same metropolitan area—even the same primate capital—
converge.79  The primate capital might still feature more internal 
heterogeneity than the major or the new capital, but it will have a 
hard time maintaining the heterogeneity added by the multiple-
capital approach where diversity is present but not proximate. 
Second, a geographically concentrated national government 
within the primate capital can reduce the degree to which the 
national government features the diversity of the primate capital.  
More metropolitan areas—particularly in poorer, democratizing 
countries—feature geographically dispersed primate capitals, more 
akin to Los Angeles than to New York City.80  While transporting 
goods has become much cheaper, it is still relatively costly to 
transport human beings across places, particularly in countries with 
 
James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network over 32 
Years, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 377 (2007). 
 76. See Bettencourt, supra note 37, at 1439; Mok et al., supra note 37, at 
2750. 
 77. See Adam K. Anderson & Elizabeth A. Phelps, Lesions of the Human 
Amygdala Impair Enhanced Perception of Emotionally Salient Events, 411 
NATURE 305, 305–06 (2001) (explaining that the human mind retains negative 
information much more effectively than neutral information, which can cause 
one population to view an emotional event as a much more important issue 
than another that has not dealt with that issue directly); Thad Williamson, 
Sprawl, Spatial Location, and Politics: How Ideological Identification Tracks 
the Built Environment, 36 AM. POL. RES. 903, 904 (2008) (showing a strong 
correlation between spatial characteristics and voting patterns). 
 78. See José E. Alvarez, Do States Socialize?, 54 DUKE L.J. 961, 969 (2005) 
(“[F]actors such as . . . individuals’ connections to relevant epistemic 
communities elsewhere matter a great deal.”). 
 79. For evidence of this, see Seth C. McKee & Jeremy M. Teigen, Probing 
the Reds and Blues: Sectionalism and Voter Location in the 2000 and 2004 U.S. 
Presidential Elections, 28 POL. GEOGRAPHY 484, 485 (2009); Jeffrey J. Mondak & 
Damarys Canache, Personality and Political Culture in the American States, 67 
POL. RES. Q. 26, 27–28 (2014); Peter J. Rentfrow el al., A Theory of the 
Emergence, Persistence, and Expression of Geographic Variation in 
Psychological Characteristics, 3 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 339, 340–41, 350 (2008); 
Wheeler, supra note 63, at 165. 
 80. Compare Edward L. Glaeser, Urban Colossus: Why Is New York 
America’s Largest City?, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Dec. 2005, at 7, 
9 (describing the density of New York City), with Nigel Harris, Urbanisation, 
Economic Development and Policy in Developing Countries, 14 HABITAT INT’L, 
no. 4, 1990, at 3, 23 (noting that some primate cities in smaller low-income 
countries spread out to the metropolitan area and actually see a decline in 
inner-city population). 
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less developed transportation infrastructure.81  This means that the 
location of employment within a metropolitan area will shape whom 
from within that metropolitan area will work there.82  The Cairo 
model of a national government, which is concentrated within the 
primate capital, will attract fewer different types of officials than 
will the Tunis model of a national government, which is more 
geographically dispersed within the primate capital. 
B. Official Interactions in Primate Capitals 
Because government officials—like everyone else—tend to 
interact more often and more meaningfully with those more 
physically proximate to them, government officials in a primate 
capital are interacting with a diverse range of private forces.  This 
can generate representative extremes.  On the one hand, a national 
government in a primate capital can monitor and regulate private 
forces at a (perhaps excessive) discount.  On the other hand, private 
forces can more easily coordinate a response to the national 
government that can lead to violent overthrows of democratic 
regimes.  These are the reasons why evidence has suggested that 
primate capitals can be bad for democratic stability in certain 
situations.83 
The primate capital has proven problematic for democratic 
consolidation because of the greater ease with which the state can 
increase state capacity.84  The primate capital will feature the most 
important individuals from various industries and other private 
forces.85  Because of their proximity to the national government, the 
national government can use its many parts to monitor these 
private forces.  This monitoring may be facilitated by the number of 
those in government who previously worked in the private sector, 
and thus have the kind of relationships with those in the private 
sector that facilitate oversight. 
The primate-capital government can use this more easily 
available information about private citizens in one of two ways.  It 
can decide to ensure citizen satisfaction with government by buying 
them off with the provision of greater public goods.  A national 
government aware of the private forces’ displeasure may have a 
desire to target public services to these private forces.86  With more 
 
 81. See Glaeser & Kohlhase, supra note 29, at 208; Schleicher, supra note 
30, at 1520. 
 82. See Paul W. Rhode & Koleman S. Strumpf, Assessing the Importance of 
Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 
1648, 1649 (2003). 
 83. See Ades & Glaeser, supra note 20, at 199. 
 84. See id. at 198–99. 
 85. See Gilles Duranton & Diego Puga, Nursery Cities: Urban Diversity, 
Process Innovation, and the Life Cycle of Products, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1454, 
1461 (2001). 
 86. See Campante & Do, supra note 57, at 6. 
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resources flowing to the private sector in the primate capital, there 
is more of a reason for those from outside of the primate capital to 
move to the primate capital in search of economic success.  This, in 
turn, generates even more pressure to expand government to 
accommodate the demands of the new residents of the primate 
capital.  In such a situation, the primate-capital government risks 
being too large and coercive for democratic consolidation. 
The primate-capital government can also use the greater 
information it receives from its location to ensure citizen obedience 
through force rather than the provision of public goods.  The 
primate-capital government can more easily determine which 
private forces pose a risk to the stability of the government.  It can 
also more easily deploy intelligence or military force within the 
primate capital in response.  This is part of the reason why 
dictatorships feature and generate such large central cities.87  
Dictatorships use coercive state power to ensure the compliance of a 
large range of forces.88  Dictatorships located outside of a primate 
capital struggle to do this as well because it is more costly for 
dictatorships to project coercive power in distant locations.89 
At the other extreme, the primate capital increases the risk of 
democratic revolutions.  Democratic revolutions are events 
determined by scale.90  The more people available to overthrow the 
government, the greater the ease of assembling the kind of massive 
mob needed to do so.  More than any other metropolitan area, the 
primate capital supplies a deep bench of individuals capable of 
organizing to overthrow a government.  The twenty-million people 
in the Cairo metropolitan area provided ample support to generate a 
critical mass in Tahrir Square to overthrow the government in 
2013.91 
The representative resonance of the primate capital is another 
reason why the representativeness of the primate capital can go to 
excess.  The fact that it was Tahrir Square hosting the protests in 
2013 added to the resonance of the protests.  The visual image of 
protestors occupying major government buildings and major streets 
signaled the importance of the uprising.92  Information about 
successful protest activity tends to spread quickly and generate 
 
 87. See Ades & Glaeser, supra note 20, at 195. 
 88. See id. at 198–99. 
 89. See Jonathan N. Markowitz & Christopher J. Fariss, Going the 
Distance: The Price of Projecting Power, 39 INT’L INTERACTIONS 119, 121–22 
(2013). 
 90. See, e.g., DiPasquale & Glaeser, supra note 58, at 52–53. 
 91. See Ford, supra note 4; see also Jeremy Wallace, Cities, Redistribution, 
and Authoritarian Regime Survival, 75 J. POL. 632, 634 (2013) (“With increased 
urban concentration, there are more potential malcontents in geographic 
locations that threaten the economic and political livelihood of the regime.”). 
 92. See Ford, supra note 4. 
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other successful protest activity.93  Protest activity in the primate 
capital can spread particularly rapidly. 
IV.  THE MAJOR-CAPITAL APPROACH 
Another approach for the fragile democratic system is to place 
the national government in a major metropolitan area that is not a 
primate metropolitan area.  This could be because there is no 
primate metropolitan area in a country and so there is no choice but 
to put the national government in a major metropolitan area that is 
not the primate metropolitan area (e.g., Washington, D.C., in the 
United States).  Or, this could be because there is a primate 
metropolitan area, but a choice is made to place the national 
government in another metropolitan area (e.g., Ankara in Turkey, 
even though Istanbul could be considered the primate metropolitan 
area). 
One caveat should be made to this major capital approach: it is 
possible only in rare circumstances to place the national government 
in a minor metropolitan area.94  This is because national 
governments in the twenty-first century tend to be large and 
complicated endeavors that—because of their scale and size—
inevitably turn the metropolitan areas around them into large and 
complicated endeavors as well.  When there are smaller 
governments, it is possible that they could be placed in a minor 
metropolitan area.95 
Major capitals are similar to primate capitals in that the 
national government is part of a major metropolitan area.  What 
differentiates major capitals from primate capitals is also what 
makes them less representative.  With fewer private forces in the 
capital area, there are fewer of these forces represented in the 
national government.  This also reduces the representative risks of 
the primate capital because the major capital undermines the 
capacity of the national government to monitor private forces and 
for private forces to monitor—and even overthrow—the national 
government. 
 
 93. See, e.g., Sophia J. Wallace et al., Spatial and Temporal Proximity: 
Examining the Effects of Protests on Political Attitudes, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 433, 
445 (2014). 
 94. See generally Moser, supra note 26 (discussing Malaysia’s decision to 
build a federal administrative capital in Putrajaya). 
 95. Consider the example of smaller American states like Vermont, whose 
capital is in Montpelier (with a population of less than 10,000). See State & 
County QuickFacts—Montpelier (City), Vermont, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/50/5046000.html (last updated Oct. 14, 
2015, 4:36 PM).  Or consider a smaller country like Grenada, with a capital of 
St. George of less than 40,000 people. See About Grenada, GOV’T GRENADA, 
http://www.gov.gd/about_grenada.html (last updated May 7, 2013, 10:15 AM). 
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A. Officials in Major Capitals 
Major metropolitan areas that do not rise to the level of primate 
metropolitan areas will lack some part of a country’s population.  
Metropolitan areas tend to specialize in particular industries.96  If 
what defines a primate metropolitan area is that it has a little bit of 
everything, then what defines a major (but nonprimate) 
metropolitan area is that the major metropolitan area is missing a 
larger number of these industries.  If the national government 
wishes to attract those missing forces to reside there and possibly 
work in government, it must endure substantial costs.  A potential 
government staffer coming from another place in the country will 
have to be willing to pay the direct costs of relocating to the major 
capital.  The potential government staffer must be willing to endure 
the opportunity costs of forsaking past personal and professional 
relationships.  All of this must be done for the uncertain benefit of 
service in government in the major capital.  That service must be 
long and substantial enough to generate future returns if the staffer 
wishes to stay in the major capital, or related enough to industries 
in their previous place of residence that government service will 
generate future returns upon returning to the previous place of 
residence. 
What this means, then, is that the decision to place the national 
government in a major metropolitan area—and the particular major 
metropolitan area selected—is and is seen as an act of affiliation.  
Additionally, if the major metropolitan area is already home to other 
substantial industries, then the placement of the national 
government there is and is seen as affiliating with these other major 
industries.  The decision to place the first democratic regime of 
Ukraine in Kiev, for instance, was a signal of affiliation with more 
Western-oriented forces that had been causing problems for the 
more Russian-oriented interests in other parts of the country.97  In 
many situations, the major metropolitan area is not home to enough 
other substantial industries to overcome the placement of the 
national government there.98  The major capital then becomes a 
company town, with the company being the government. 
 
 96. See Sukkoo Kim, Expansion of Markets and the Geographic Distribution 
of Economic Activities: The Trends in U.S. Regional Manufacturing Structure, 
1860–1987, 110 Q.J. ECON. 881, 903 (1995); Sukkoo Kim, Regions, Resources, 
and Economic Geography: Sources of U.S. Regional Comparative Advantage, 
1880–1987, 29 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 1, 1–2 (1999). 
 97. See Chrystia Freeland, Kiev Protests: Ukraine’s Democracy Fatigue, 
PROSPECT MAG. (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features 
/ukraine-euromaidan-yanukovych-protest-kie. 
 98. See, e.g., Ukraine Economy: How Bad Is the Mess and Can It Be Fixed?, 
BBC (May 1, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26767864; see also 
Daryna Krasnolutska & Volodymyr Verbyany, Cracks in Ukrainian Economy 
Surface Beyond Kiev’s Cloak of Calm, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 1, 2015, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-01/ukrainian-economy-starts-
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B. Official Interactions in Major Capitals 
The private forces that are missing from the major capital not 
only reduce the range of people that will serve in government, but 
also reduce the range of people that the national government will be 
able to monitor.  With private forces farther away, national 
governments have different choices of how to monitor them, none of 
which are as efficient as the primate-capital approach.  National 
governments can themselves decentralize, opening offices within the 
government that are located outside of the major capital and report 
to officials in the major capital.  National governments can rely on 
subnational governments to monitor these private forces outside of 
the major capital.  In either situation, though, the distance between 
these government officials doing the monitoring generates 
substantial agency costs.99 
The private forces that are missing from the major capital are 
also less able to interact with the national government.  This can be 
good if these private forces missing from the capital are 
undermining democratic consolidation, which can also undermine 
the democratic process in the national government.100  Many Latin 
American countries transitioning to democracy benefited from the 
absence of authoritarian forces in the capital metropolitan area.101  
This can be bad if these private forces missing from the capital are 
crucial to democratic consolidation.  Before Lagos was the clear 
Nigerian primate metropolitan area, the absence of certain tribes 
from Lagos made the Nigerian national government never fully 
representative of the entire country.102 
Because these private forces are missing from major capitals, 
the risks of revolutions in major capitals are lower than the risks of 
revolutions in primate capitals.103  There are problems of scale in 
the major capital, meaning that there might not be enough people or 
private power to overthrow the national government.  There are also  
problems of control in the major capital, meaning that simply 
capturing the major capital does not capture the entire 
governmental infrastructure of the country (there will be 
 
to-buckle-behind-cloak-of-calm-in-kiev (detailing further the problems with the 
Ukrainian economy). 
 99. See, e.g., Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, Monitoring America, WASH. 
POST, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/monitoring 
-america/1 (last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (discussing how the Department of 
Homeland Security monitors smaller, distant agencies at a high cost). 
 100. See David Fontana, The Narrowing of Federal Power by the American 
Political Capital, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 733, 736 (2015). 
 101. See, e.g., Edward L. Gibson, Boundary Control: Subnational 
Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries, 58 WORLD POL. 101, 131–32 (2005). 
 102. See Omolade Adejuyigbe, The Case for a New Federal Capital in 
Nigeria, 8 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 301, 304 (1970). 
 103. See Fontana, supra note 100, at 754–55; Goldberg, supra note 10 
(manuscript at 9). 
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government officials or sympathizers in other metropolitan areas 
who must be captured too). 
V.  THE NEW-CAPITAL APPROACH 
Another approach—a particularly expensive one—is to 
construct a new metropolitan area to house the national 
government.  The ambitions of the new capital are usually explicitly 
representative: a new capital will be a new (democratic) start that 
will give everyone a chance to work for and access the national 
government. 
A. Officials in New Capitals 
One of the arguments for the new capital is that it creates the 
potential for equal representation in government.  Existing 
metropolitan areas make it easier for some forces to reside and work 
there.  Those already residing in a metropolitan area are more likely 
to stay there than those who are not from the metropolitan area to 
move there.104  By contrast, everyone has to endure the direct costs 
of relocation to move to the new capital.  Everyone has to endure the 
opportunity costs of forsaking existing personal and professional 
relationships in their place of origin.  The new capital is the equal 
capital. 
There are limitations to the idea of the new capital as the equal 
capital.  The new capital has to be located somewhere in the 
country.  If it is centrally located, that fact might increase the 
chance that it is equally accessible to all in the country.105  Even 
then, differences in transportation networks might not make it 
equally accessible from all parts of the country.  A new capital is 
also a company town, dedicated to hosting the national government.  
This means that some people—particularly those less interested in a 
career in or debates about government—will be less inclined to 
relocate to the new capital.106 
B. Official Interactions in New Capitals 
Official interactions in the new capital are likely to be with a 
narrower range of private forces than in the primate or major 
capital.  The new capital is specifically constructed to be a company 
town—that is what makes it a “new” capital.  The result is that 
 
 104. See Jae Hong Kim, Residential and Job Mobility: Interregional 
Variation and Their Interplay in US Metropolitan Areas, 51 URB. STUD. 2863, 
2866, 2867 fig.1 (2014). 
 105. James Madison remarked at the Constitutional Convention that it was 
important that “every part of the community should have the power of sending, 
with equal facility, to the seat of Government such representatives . . . .” 1 
ANNALS OF CONG. 862 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 106. See Fontana, supra note 100, at 745–46. 
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there will be a narrower range of private forces existing in the new 
capital.107  Those with the greatest incentive to base themselves in 
the new capital will be those working for, or closely with, the 
national government, excluding from the new capital many other 
private forces.  This situation may constrain the capacity of the 
national government to monitor the limited number of private forces 
in the new capital, but it may also constrain the capacity of private 
forces to monitor the national government because so few of them 
will be in the new capital. 
Even with their narrowing effects, new capitals tend to be 
dynamic places characterized by creativity rather than 
narrowness.108  The mere act of serving in the new capital is meant 
to generate new officials.  New locations disrupt established and 
problematic practices and serve as a place of “creative 
destruction.”109  Conventional wisdom tends not to travel well across 
space.110  Some countries, such as Malaysia, move capital cities to 
distance themselves from corrosive colonial pasts and create new 
patterns of government.111 
CONCLUSION 
Democratic revolutions tend to be affiliated with particular 
places.  Not many outside of Egypt knew of Tahrir Square before, 
but now Tahrir Square is known as the home of the Egyptian 
Revolution of 2011 and a central place in the story of the Arab 
Spring.  The Berlin Wall is the place known as the home of the 
democratic revolutions in 1989.  Place is at the core of our narratives 
of how countries start the democratic process. 
Place also needs to be at the core of our narratives of how 
countries continue—and fail or succeed—at the process of 
democratic consolidation.  This Symposium Essay has attempted to 
start that conversation by focusing on one aspect of place and 
democratic consolidation: where the capitals of national 
 
 107. See id. at 739, 754 (describing how the dominance of the federal 
government in Washington D.C.’s economy limited the influence of private 
forces). 
 108. See Moser, supra note 26, at 285 (describing Malaysia’s new capital 
Putrajaya as “a stable, prosperous, progressive, and technologically 
sophisticated Muslim country, [that] at the same time, showcase[s] Malaysia’s 
rootedness in traditional culture and religion.”). 
 109. Cf. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 
(1942) (“This process of creative destruction is the essential fact about 
capitalism.”). 
 110. See Meric S. Gertler, Tacit Knowledge and the Economic Geography of 
Context, or the Undefinable Tacitness of Being (There), 3 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 
75, 79 (2003) (identifying tacit knowledge as hard to transmit across distance). 
 111. See Moser, supra note 26, at 289 (“[T]he construction of a new capital 
was seen to be . . . a move that would distance Malaysia from its colonial past 
while emphasizing its new identity as a sovereign nation.”). 
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governments are placed and how that shapes the representative 
nature of new democratic regimes.  If we want to know who will 
work for and with democratizing regimes, we need to know where 
these regimes will be. 
